Categorie: Report

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Emerging Systemic Risks in the 21st Century

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) | 2003

What is new about major risks in the 21st century? Recent years have witnessed a host of large-scale disasters of various kinds throughout the world: hugely damaging windstorms and flooding in Europe and ice storms in Canada; new diseases infecting both humans (AIDS, the Ebola virus) and animals (BSE); terrorist attacks such as those of 11 September 2001 in the United States and the Sarin gas attack in Japan; major disruptions to critical infrastructures caused by computer viruses or simply technical failure.

These are just some of the extremely costly disasters that have struck over the past few years. And yet, it is not just the nature of major risks that seems to be changing, but also the context within which they appear and society’s capacity to manage them. The forces shaping these changes are many and varied. For example, weather conditions appear to be becoming increasingly extreme.

Lees verder “Emerging Systemic Risks in the 21st Century”

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Brundtland Report

United Nations | April 1987

The first explicit common reference to sustainable development was in the 1987 Brundtland Report Our Common Future of the United Nations Commission on Environment and Development.

In this report, sustainable development was defined as: “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. In 1987 the need for cooperating on this was high.

Lees verder “Brundtland Report”

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Millennium Development Goals

United Nations | 2000

One way to improve global governance of society and nature’s public domain is to work on governance codes. Another is to pursue goals on global public policy issues. The United Nations set the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000.

In September 2000, building upon a decade of major United Nations conferences and summits, world leaders came together at United Nations Headquarters in New York to adopt the United Nations Millennium Declaration.

They committed their nations to a new global partnership to reduce extreme poverty and set out a series of time-bound targets – with a deadline of 2015. They were the first attempt to formulate global targets and are the predecessors of the Sustainable Development Goals SDGs. 

Download Millennium Declaration.

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Fukushima report

The National Diet of Japan | 2012

The evaluation of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011, which was caused by an earthquake followed by a tsunami, is a good example of zooming out from a disaster and learning the lessons. It is a true example of self-reflection because it digs deep into the public ecosystem where government, business, and civic society meet. It is a form of network analysis. The disaster had a major impact on the natural environment and ecosystems. The disaster shocked the entire world.

The National Diet of Japan

The conclusions of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission were thorough and blistering. They shed light on how attitudes, stakes, and rules and their interdependencies, and the lack of cooperation in peacetime (read: before the earthquake and the tsunami) between organisations related to the public domain, had increased the disaster.

The major conclusions [quote]:

    • In order to prevent future disasters, fundamental reforms must take place. These reforms must cover both the structure of the electric power industry and the structure of the related government and regulatory agencies as well as the operation processes. They must cover both normal and emergency situations. 
    • The TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident was the result of collusion between the government, the regulators and TEPCO, and the lack of governance by said parties. They effectively betrayed the nation’s right to be safe from nuclear accidents. Therefore, we conclude that the accident was clearly “manmade”. We believe that the root causes were the organisational and regulatory systems that supported faulty rationales for decisions and actions, rather than issues relating to the competency of any specific individual. 
    • We conclude that TEPCO was too quick to cite the tsunami as the cause of the nuclear accident and deny that the earthquake caused any damage.
    • The Commission concludes that there were organisational problems within TEPCO. Had there been a higher level of knowledge, training, and equipment inspection related to severe accidents, and had there been specific instructions given to the on-site workers concerning the state of emergency within the necessary time frame, a more effective accident response would have been possible. 
    • The Commission concludes that the situation continued to deteriorate because the crisis management system of the Kantei, the regulators and other responsible agencies did not function correctly. The boundaries defining the roles and responsibilities of the parties involved were problematic, due to their ambiguity. 
    • The Commission concludes that the residents’ confusion over the evacuation stemmed from the regulators’ negligence and failure over the years to implement adequate measures against a nuclear disaster, as well as a lack of action by previous governments and regulators focused on crisis management. The crisis management system that existed for the Kantei and the regulators should protect the health and safety of the public, but it failed in this function. 
    • The Commission recognizes that the residents in the affected area are still struggling from the effects of the accident. They continue to face grave concerns, including the health effects of radiation exposure, displacement, the dissolution of families, disruption of their lives and lifestyles and the contamination of vast areas of the environment. There is no foreseeable end to the decontamination and restoration activities that are essential for rebuilding communities. 
    • The Commission concludes that the government and the regulators are not fully committed to protecting public health and safety; that they have not acted to protect the health of the residents and to restore their welfare. 
    • The Commission has concluded that the safety of nuclear energy in Japan and the public cannot be assured unless the regulators go through an essential transformation process. The entire organisation needs to be transformed, not as a formality but in a substantial way. Japan’s regulators need to shed the insular attitude of ignoring international safety standards and transform themselves into a globally trusted entity. 
    • TEPCO did not fulfil its responsibilities as a private corporation, instead obeying and relying upon the government bureaucracy of METI, the government agency driving nuclear policy. At the same time, through the auspices of the FEPC, it manipulated the cozy relationship with the regulators to take the teeth out of regulations. 
    • The Commission concludes that it is necessary to realign existing laws and regulations concerning nuclear energy. Mechanisms must be established to ensure that the latest technological findings from international sources are reflected in all existing laws and regulations.
    • Replacing people or changing the names of institutions will not solve the problems. Unless these root causes are resolved, preventive measures against future similar accidents will never be complete.” [unquote] 

The chairman of the research commission of the National Diet report Kiyoshi Kurokawa summarised the conclusions [quote]:

    • The disaster cannot be regarded as a natural disaster. It was a profoundly manmade disaster – that could and should have been foreseen and prevented. And its effects could have been mitigated by a more effective human response.
    • Our report catalogues a multitude of errors and wilful negligence that left the Fukushima plant unprepared for the events of March 11. And it examines serious deficiencies in the response to the accident by TEPCO, regulators and the government. 
    • What must be admitted – very painfully – is that this was a disaster “Made in Japan.” Its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to ‘sticking with the program’; our groupism; and our insularity.  Had other Japanese been in the shoes of those who bear responsibility for this accident, the result may well have been the same. 
    • Following the 1970s “oil shocks,” Japan accelerated the development of nuclear power in an effort to achieve national energy security. As such, it was embraced as a policy goal by government and business alike, and pursued with the same single-minded determination that drove Japan’s postwar economic miracle. 
    • With such a powerful mandate, nuclear power became an unstoppable force, immune to scrutiny by civil society. Its regulation was entrusted to the same government bureaucracy responsible for its promotion. At a time when Japan’s self-confidence was soaring, a tightly knit elite with enormous financial resources had diminishing regard for anything ‘not invented here.’ 
    • This conceit was reinforced by the collective mindset of Japanese bureaucracy, by which the first duty of any individual bureaucrat is to defend the interests of his organisation. Carried to an extreme, this led bureaucrats to put organisational interests ahead of their paramount duty to protect public safety. 
    • Only by grasping this mindset can one understand how Japan’s nuclear industry managed to avoid absorbing the critical lessons learned from Three Mile Island and Chernobyl; and how it became accepted practice to resist regulatory pressure and cover up small-scale accidents. It was this mindset that led to the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant. 
    • This report singles out numerous individuals and organisations for harsh criticism, but the goal is not—and should not be—to lay blame. The goal must be to learn from this disaster, and reflect deeply on its fundamental causes, in order to ensure that it is never repeated. 
    • Many of the lessons relate to policies and procedures, but the most important is one upon which each and every Japanese citizen should reflect very deeply. 
    • The consequences of negligence at Fukushima stand out as catastrophic, but the mindset that supported it can be found across Japan. In recognizing that fact, each of us should reflect on our responsibility as individuals in a democratic society. 
    • As the first investigative commission to be empowered by the legislature and independent of the bureaucracy, we hope this initiative can contribute to the development of Japan’s civil society. Above all, we have endeavoured to produce a report that meets the highest standard of transparency. The people of Fukushima, the people of Japan and the global community deserve nothing less. [unquote]

Bibliography

The National Diet of Japan (2012) The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission. The National Diet of Japan https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/report/

 

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Global Risks Report 2008

World Economic Forum | 2008

“Over the last year, a series of risk issues – from the liquidity crisis in the financial markets to the emerging concerns over the long-term security of food supply – have focused global attention on the fragility of the global system. An awareness of risk and risk management is increasingly viewed as a prerequisite for effective control in both the private and public sectors.

This year will be no different. Uncertainty about the short- and medium-term future is as high as it has been for a decade. Economically, the uncertainty centres on how the global economy will respond to the spreading liquidity crunch of 2007. The mispricing of financial risk, a central theme of Global Risks 2007, may have further to unwind. Geopolitically, uncertainty is focused on the possibility of an escalation in tensions with Iran and concerns over the long-term integrity of the states of Iraq and Afghanistan.

The result of uncertainty could be inaction in dealing with other, less immediate, global risks. Action to mitigate climate change, for example, may be put in danger should the global economy weaken substantially – even though many of the political, economic and investment decisions which will shape the future path of global climate will need to be made in the next five years. Proactive management of globalization to ensure its long-term sustainability may be derailed by the prevailing currents of uncertainty. But inaction on long-term risks will only weaken the global capacity to manage future challenges.

Under conditions of global stress, one core question of global risk management will become more salient than ever: who owns the risk? Without a shared understanding of ownership, achieving the trade-offs which may be necessary to mitigate global risk equitably and sustainably will be extremely difficult.

Without clarity on who is responsible for managing global risk, turning aspirations into actions will be impossible. Without frameworks which connect ownership of risk with the responsibility to mitigate it, and which share the upside and downside of risk among stakeholders efficiently, the market mechanisms for managing risk will fail to improve our aggregate global resilience in the face of inevitable risk events. And without leadership from the business and political communities on all of these issues, we may find our global future shaped more by risk events than by our power to anticipate, manage and mitigate them.

The present report looks at global risks from a range of different perspectives

The first part of the report focuses on four emerging issues that are shaping the global risk landscape: systemic financial risk, food security, supply chains and the role of energy. On systemic financial risk, we put current market turmoil in the historical context and ask how the transformation of the global financial system over the last two decades may require us to rethink our expectations and understanding of systemic risk in the future. On food security, we discuss how the subject has moved from the periphery of the global risk landscape to its centre, and ask whether the world is ready to cope with the various trade-offs that the new food economy is generating. On supply chains, we investigate a potentially hidden set of vulnerabilities in the global economy to supply chain disruptions. Finally, on energy, we outline the emergence of a range of energy-related risks and ask if the world can move towards secure and sustainable energy.

The second part of the report presents our collective assessment of global risks in 2008, based on a revised taxonomy of risk, and building on the assessments of past years. In the third part, we look at the methodological hurdles around the representation of interconnectedness and demonstrate how risk “squeezing” and homogenization of risk are changing the way we perceive risk globally. In the fourth part of the report, we examine the role of financial markets as tools of risk transfer and risk mitigation for an increasingly broad range of global risks. Finally, in the fifth part, we take forward our discussions on the construction of risk mitigation coalitions and country risk management, establishing a set of principles for country risk management which the Global Risk Network will develop in 2008-2009.

The Global Risk Network, part of the World Economic Forum since 2005, will continue to generate discussion and dialogue between the corporate and public sectors. In 2008-2009, the World Economic Forum and partners of the Global Risk Report – Citigroup, Marsh & McLennan Companies, Swiss Re, the Wharton School Risk Center and Zurich Financial Services – will broaden the participation of the global business and policy community.”

Global Risks Report 2008

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De Nederlandse Corporate Governance Code 2016

Monitoring Commissie Corporate Governance Code | 2016

De Nederlandse corporate governance code (hierna: de Code) richt zich op de governance van beursgenoteerde vennootschappen en geeft een richtsnoer voor effectieve samenwerking en bestuur. Governance gaat over besturen en beheersen, over verantwoordelijkheid en zeggenschap en over toezicht en verantwoording.

Het doel van de Code is het met of in relatie tot wet- en regelgeving bewerkstelligen van een deugdelijk en transparant stelsel van checks and balances binnen Nederlandse beursgenoteerde vennootschappen en het daartoe reguleren van de verhoudingen tussen het bestuur, de raad van commissarissen en de algemene vergadering/aandeelhouders.

Naleving van de Code draagt bij aan het vertrouwen in goed en verantwoord bestuur van vennootschappen en hun inbedding in de maatschappij.

De Code is voor het eerst vastgesteld in 2003 en eenmalig gewijzigd in 2008. Op verzoek van het Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond, Eumedion, de Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging, Euronext NV, de Vereniging van Effectenbezitters, de Vereniging van Effecten Uitgevende Ondernemingen en de Vereniging VNO-NCW is de Code aangepast door de Monitoring Commissie Corporate Governance Code (hierna: de Commissie). Voortschrijdende ontwikkelingen, de tijdgeest en overlap met wetgeving zijn aanleiding geweest om de Code aan te passen. Onderhavige Code vervangt de Code uit 2008.

Reikwijdte

De Code is van toepassing op:

    • alle vennootschappen met statutaire zetel in Nederland waarvan de aandelen of certificaten van aandelen zijn toegelaten tot de handel op een gereglementeerde markt of een daarmee vergelijkbaar systeem; en
    • alle grote vennootschappen met statutaire zetel in Nederland (> € 500 miljoen balanswaarde) waarvan de aandelen of certificaten zijn toegelaten tot de handel op een multilaterale handelsfaciliteit of een daarmee vergelijkbaar systeem.

Voor de toepassing van de Code worden met houders van aandelen gelijk gesteld de houders van certificaten van aandelen die met medewerking van de vennootschap zijn uitgegeven. De Code is niet van toepassing op een beleggingsinstelling of instelling voor collectieve belegging in effecten die geen beheerder is in de zin van artikel 1:1 Wet op het financieel toezicht.

Inhoud van de Code

De Code bevat principes en best practice bepalingen die de verhouding reguleren tussen het bestuur, de raad van commissarissen en de algemene vergadering/aandeelhouders. De principes en bepalingen zijn gericht op de invulling van verantwoordelijkheden voor lange termijn waardecreatie, beheersing van risico’s, effectief bestuur en toezicht, beloningen en de relatie met (de algemene vergadering van) aandeelhouders en stakeholders.

De principes kunnen worden opgevat als breed gedragen algemene opvattingen over goede corporate governance. De principes zijn uitgewerkt in best practice bepalingen. Deze bepalingen bevatten normen voor het gedrag van bestuurders, commissarissen en aandeelhouders. Zij geven de ‘best practice’ weer en zijn een invulling van de algemene beginselen van goede corporate governance. Vennootschappen kunnen hiervan gemotiveerd afwijken. De voorwaarden voor afwijking worden hierna onder ‘Naleving van de Code’ toegelicht.

De verhouding tussen de vennootschap en haar werknemers (en vertegenwoordigers) is bij wet geregeld. In de Code komt deze verhouding aan bod in bepalingen die betrekking hebben op cultuur en de contacten tussen de raad van commissarissen en het medezeggenschapsorgaan.

Download De Nederlandse Corporate Governance Code 2016.

Read in English.

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COSO Enterprise Risk Management

Integrating with Strategy and Performance, June 2017

This project was commissioned by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), which is dedicated to providing thought leadership through the development of comprehensive frameworks and guidance on internal control, enterprise risk management, and fraud deterrence designed to improve organi- zational performance and oversight and to reduce the extent of fraud in organizations.

Foreword

“In keeping with its overall mission, the COSO Board commissioned and published in 2004 Enterprise Risk Management—Integrated Framework. Over the past decade, that publication has gained broad acceptance by organizations in their efforts to manage risk. However, also through that period, the complexity of risk has changed, new risks have emerged, and both boards and executives have enhanced their awareness and oversight of enterprise risk management while asking for improved risk reporting. This update to the 2004 publication addresses the evolution of enterprise risk management and the need for organizations to improve their approach to managing risk to meet the demands of an evolving business environment.

The updated document, now titled Enterprise Risk Management—Integrating with Strategy and Performance, highlights the importance of considering risk in both the strategy-setting process and in driving performance. The first part of the updated publication offers a perspective on current and evolving concepts and applications of enterprise risk management. The second part, the Framework, is organized into five easy-to-understand components that accommodate different viewpoints and operating structures, and enhance strategies and decision-making. In short, this update:

  • Provides greater insight into the value of enterprise risk management when setting and carrying out strategy.
  • Enhances alignment between performance and enterprise risk management to improve the setting of performance targets and understanding the impact of risk on performance.
  • Accommodates expectations for governance and oversight.
  • Recognizes the globalization of markets and operations and the need to apply a common, albeit tailored, approach across geographies.
  • Presents new ways to view risk to setting and achieving objectives in the context of greater business complexity.
  • Expands reporting to address expectations for greater stakeholder transparency.
  • Accommodates evolving technologies and the proliferation of data and analytics in sup- porting decision-making.
The figure illustrates the framework considerations in the context of mission, vision, core values, and as a driver of an entity’s overall direction and performance.

Sets out core definitions, components, and principles for all levels of management involved in designing, implementing, and conducting enterprise risk management practices.

Readers may also wish to consult a complementary publication, COSO’s Internal Control— Integrated Framework. The two publications are distinct and have different focuses; neither supersedes the other. However, they do connect. Internal Control—Integrated Framework encompasses internal control, which is referenced in part in this updated publication, and therefore the earlier document remains viable and suitable for designing, implementing, conducting, and assessing internal control, and for consequent reporting.

The COSO Board would like to thank PwC for its significant contributions in developing Enterprise Risk Management—Integrating with Strategy and Performance. Their full consideration of input provided by many stakeholders and their insight were instrumental in ensuring that the strengths of the original publication have been preserved, and that text has been clarified or expanded where it was deemed helpful to do so. The COSO Board and PwC together would also like to thank the Advisory Council and Observers for their contributions in reviewing and providing feedback.”

By Robert B. Hirth Jr. (COSO Chair) and Dennis L. Chesley (PwC Project Lead Partner and Global and APA Risk and Regulatory Leader)

2017 COSO ERM: Integrating with Strategy and Performance (Executive-Summary)